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The Timeliness Threat to
Intervention of Right
It is widely recognized that litigation can adversely affect the interests of parties not involved in a particular dispute.1 Concerned with
this problem, federal courts long have sought to mitigate the possibly
unfair impact of their processes through the doctrine of intervention. 2
The courts cannot allow all affected nonparties to participate, however,
because expanding the size of the litigation will often prejudice the
parties already before the court and interfere with the efficient conduct
of court proceedings. The compromise adopted by the federal courts
has been to evolve a set of conditions which, when met, establish a nonparty's right to intervene. 3 One of these conditions is that the application for intervention must be timely.
This Note argues that federal trial courts presently enjoy undue
discretion in determining whether a nonparty's application for intervention of right is timely. This excessive discretion produces two unfortunate results. First, the discretion virtually collapses the concept of
a right to intervene into the category of permissive intervention, 4 even
1. See, e.g., Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978) (preliminary injunction
granted prisoners against prison administration may affect interest of prison guards in
security); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976) (court allocation of fishing rights
between States and Indians may affect interests of non-Indian commercial fishermen).
2. See, e.g., Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U.S. 545 (1885) (approving of intervention by nonparty who claimed priority of lien on goods in custody of court); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S.
450 (1860) (recognizing principle that in proceeding in rem any person claiming interest in
property paramount to that of libellant may intervene to protect his interest; similar
principle in proceedings by attachment in court of common law). Intervention is the
procedural device enabling a nonparty to present a claim or defense in a pending action
and become a party for the purpose of the claim or defense presented. Moore & Levi,
Federal Intervention: L The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 565
(1936).
3. The original Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) was intended to codify the
general doctrines of intervention as they existed in 1938 and was not regarded as a
comprehensive inventory of the allowable instances for intervention. Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505-06, 508 (1941); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRAcricE 24.07[2], at 24-154 (2d ed. 1979); Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1231 & n.1l1 (1966). Some undetermined expansion of the
doctrine was envisioned by the authors of the Rule. Advisory Note to original Rule 24,
28 U.S.C. app. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, at 432 (1976).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 distinguishes a right to intervene from permissive intervention;
it reads:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
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though the latter is oriented toward different goals, is more vague, and
is less reviewable. 5 This collapse undermines any meaningful right to
intervene. Second, principled evolution of the criteria defining a right
to intervene is frustrated. Together these consequences mark a retreat
in judicial concern for fairness to adversely affected nonparties. These
consequences may be avoided, this Note argues, if Rule 24(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is restructured using the device of
serial ordering.
I.

The Right to Intervene

The desire of federal courts to minimize the injustice their processes
work on nonparties motivated them early to originate and develop a
right to intervene. 6 This desire led the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to distinguish between intervention of right and permissive intervention.7 Intervention of right served the policy of minimizing injustice to nonparties.8 Third parties had a right to intervene
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
5. Intervention of right is a procedural device primarily designed to minimize judicially caused harm to nonparties, see pp. 587-88 infra, and an application for intervention
of right seems to pose only a question of law, 7A C. WRicrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEoua. 466 (1972). An applicant possessing a right to intervene need not
show an independent ground of federal jurisdiction, 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 3, 24.0711], at 24-153, and an appeal will more automatically lie from an order refusing intervention of right, id. Permissive intervention, on the other hand, is designed to
promote court efficiency, see pp. 587-88 infra, and it is "discretionary by definition,"
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It requires an independent
jurisdictional ground, Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 72 F.R.D. 164, 169-70 (E.D.
La. 1976), and an appeal will less automatically lie from a denial of permissive intervention, 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 3,
24.07[l], at 24-153.
6. See Eliot, Interventions in the Federal Courts, 31 AM. L. REv. 377, 377, 380, 392
(1897) (early practice of intervention). Commentators explained early intervention practice
by the principle that no court should permit its judgment, decree, or process to work
injustice. Id. at 378; Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 573.
7. See Levi & Moore, Federal Intervention: II. The Procedure, Status, and Federal
JurisdictionalRequirements, 47 YALE L.J. 898, 899-900 (1938). This Note will avoid the
older terminology of Levi and Moore distinguishing an "absolute right to intervene" from
a "discretionary right to intervene." Instead it will denote the two categories of intervention delineated in Rule 24 by the presently more common terms, "intervention of right"
and "permissive intervention."
8. Levi & Moore, supra note 7, at 902-03; Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 581, 607; see
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Rule 24 right to intervene implements basic jurisprudential assumption that interest of justice best served when all parties
with real stake in controversy afforded opportunity to be heard).
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when a judgment might either bind them personally, even though they
were inadequately represented, or dispose of property in which they
had an interest. 9 By contrast, permissive intervention under the Rules
was a device aimed at promoting court convenience and efficiency,'0
predicated on a desire to avoid a multiplicity of actions where possible.1 ' Although in particular cases these two goals may coincide, they
are conceptually distinct.' 2 The courts have not followed the suggestion
that the distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention be eliminated,' 3 and indeed have continued to develop a
strong concept of intervention of right quite distinct from the device
14
of permissive intervention.
The 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules, which liberalized the
9. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, 24.01[I.-I], at 24-12.
10. Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 581, 607.
11. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE, supra note 3,
24.10[1], at 24-351 to 24-352 (permissive intervention akin to permissive joinder, class suit, and consolidation in efficiency
orientation).
12. The primary purpose of intervention of right to secure justice to nonparties, in
contrast to the efficiency purpose of permissive intervention, is illustrated by the fact that
there are cases in which the applicant possesses a right to intervene yet cannot sue independently if intervention is denied. Subsequent suit may be barred because the applicant lacks either standing or a right of action, as when the intervenor seeks to participate to influence the framing of an equitable remedy. See, e.g., Preston v. Thompson,
589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978) (denying intervention to prison guards who wished to influence
preliminary injunctive relief to prisoners). In such cases, allowing intervention cannot
serve efficiency, and to some extent must sacrifice it, because the would-be intervenor is
seldom in a position to bring suit later if intervention is denied. There is thus little
possibility of multiple suits if intervention is denied. This central fact indicating the basic
orientation of intervention of right has sometimes been overlooked. See Brunet, A Study
in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources, 12 GA. L. Rav. 701, 734 (1978) (stating that
any intervention petition meeting interest and impairment requirements of 24(a)(2) is
likely to promote efficiency by avoiding multiple trials). Despite the primary concern of
intervention of right with justice to nonparties, Rule 24(a)(2) may nevertheless produce
some efficiencies. For example, the representation and impaired interest requirements
promote efficiency by reducing duplication of informational input and by helping to
ensure adversarial incentive. Id. at 720-46. For a discussion of efficiency concerns in the
1966 Amendments to the Rule, see pp. 590-91 infra.
13. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329,
375-78 (1969) (Rule 24 should relegate all intervention to discretion of trial judge and
should elaborate factors to be weighed in making the decision).
14. The courts have reasserted the traditional rationale for establishing a right to
intervene, that justice is best served when all parties with a real stake in a controversy
are afforded an opportunity to be heard, Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir.
1972), and have emphasized the distinction between intervention of right and permissive
intervention, see, e.g., Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978) (intervention of right motions should be treated more leniently
than permissive intervention motions because serious harm more likely with former). Extensive development of the three conditions that distinguish intervention of right from
permissive intervention also testifies to the judicial intention to preserve the former as
sui generis. See notes 17-19 infra (development of interest requirement); note 21 infra
(development of practical impairment requirement); note 23 infra (development of representation requirement).

Timeliness and Intervention
doctrine of intervention of right, premised possession of the right on
four conditions. First, the application for intervention must be timely.1 5
Second, the applicant must have an interest in the subject of the
action;' 6 traditionally this requirement has been met by showing a
property or contractual interest,' but more generalized "economic interests" are now sufficient' and even noneconomic interests may be
enough.' 9 Third, the applicant must be so situated that disposition of
the action may adversely affect his interest; 20 this "practical impair15. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The timeliness requirement has been carried through from
the original Rule. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 24
makes no mention of the timeliness provision, see 28 U.S.C. app. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, at

432-33 (1976), nor did any Advisory Committee Note in the history of the Rule, see id.
The Rule has never provided guidelines as to the meaning of timeliness. See Black v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974) (because Rule 24 silent on
what constitutes timeliness, question must be answered in each case by discretion of
court); Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803, 805-06 (10th Cir. 1941) (same).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The 1966 Amendment eliminated the former distinction
between property and nonproperty cases and substituted the interest requirement. Compare original Rule 24(a), 28 U.S.C. § 723c app. (1940), with FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
17. See, e.g., Penick v. Columbus Educ. Ass'n, 574 F.2d 889, 890 (6th Cir. 1978) (employment contracts of teachers provide requisite interest in school desegregation suit).
18. Prior to the 1966 Amendment, a very narrow concept of interest was often employed. See, e.g., Kelley v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665, 673 (10th Cir. 1954) (intervention of
right requires interest of such nature that applicant will gain or lose by direct legal
operation of the judgment); Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 242, 249 (W.D. Ark.
1947) (intervention of right requires that interest in property be known and protected by
law, sufficient to be denominated a lien, legal or equitable). Since the 1966 Amendment,
property interests not secured by contract have been held to meet the interest requirement. See, e.g., Fleming v. Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., 577 F.2d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979) (finding requisite interest when property owners feared
that planned community would endanger purity and potability of reservoir water);
Planned Parenthood of Minn., Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869
(8th Cir. 1977) (finding requisite interest when applicants sought to defend city moratorium on construction of abortion clinics out of fear clinics would have adverse effect on
property values).
19. Parents have an interest in a desegregated school system, for example, that can
support a right to intervene. Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977) (all parents and students, whether minority or not, have interest in desegregated school system that justifies intervention in desegregation suit);
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1974) (parents
of students of Chinese ancestry had right to intervene in school desegregation suit brought
by black plaintiffs). The interest of parents merely in the education of their children may
in certain circumstances support a right to intervene. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175,
179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (parents had requisite interest to intervene to appeal decree they
thought curtailed defendant school board's discretion over educational policy). For a
survey of the types of interest that may be sufficient to ground a right to intervene, see
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81

HARV. L. REv. 721, 729-40 (1968).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Amendment relaxed the requirement of the pre-1966
Rule that, to intervene as of right, an unrepresented applicant must show he is or may
be bound by the judgment. Advisory Committee's Note to amended Rule 24, 28 U.S.C.

app. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, at 433 (1976); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. Rav. 356, 401-

03 (1967).
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ment" can be established in a wide variety of relationships. 2 ' Fourth,
the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by existing
parties. 22 Courts have tended to find representation inadequate in an
increasing number of situations.23 In keeping with the general emphasis
of the 1966 Amendments on flexibility over formalism, 2 4 amended
Rule 24(a) abandoned several arbitrary constraints on the requirements
of "impairment" and "inadequate representation." 25 The amended
Rule thus prepared a foundation for further judicial expansion of the
right to intervene.
Although the Amendment expanded the types of situation that could
trigger the intervention right, the authors of the amended Rule
recognized that expanded intervention could obstruct orderly court
procedure. The Advisory Committee attempted to limit the impact of
the new Rule on court procedures by relying upon the old distinction
21. Practical impairment may result from a variety of litigation outcomes, including
the stare decisis effect of a judgment, see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978), an adverse
economic effect, see, e.g., Fleming v. Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., 577 F.2d 236, 238 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979) (finding impairment when property owners
feared planned community would endanger purity and potability of reservoir water), or
the possibility of conflicting injunctions, see, e.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d
257, 268 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding impairment when, if applicants' contentions found
meritorious in separate proceeding, they would be unable to secure effective relief without injunction conflicting with consent order in present case). Practical impairment may
even result when the remedy would divert an undue share of the resources of a government agency. See Adams v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs in suit
against HEW to obtain enforcement of one statute had right to intervene in another suit
against HEW in which plaintiffs sought enforcement of another statute).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
23. This expansion can be seen clearly from the cases in which the government is
representing private interests. Although some courts have presumed that governmental
representation is adequate when the representative is charged by law with representing
the interests of the nonparty, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976), an increasing number of courts presume that
the representative of the public interest is an inadequate representative of special interests, even of those special interests the government intends to protect, see, e.g., National
Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977) (labeling government agency task of
protecting not only public interest but also private interest of petitioners in intervention "impossible"). This is particularly true when damages are sought only by the applicant. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1239 (2d Cir. 1972). The fact
that the applicant's case may be heard and accommodated by a party, without the direct
involvement of the court, may provide an additional reason for holding that representation is adequate. See Penick v. Columbus Educ. Ass'n, 574 F.2d 889, 890 (6th Cir. 1978).
24. See Cohn, supra note 3, at 1229.
25. See id. at 1232. Cohn notes, for example, that a preliminary draft permitted intervention only if pending litigation may "as a practical matter substantially impair or
impede" the applicant's protection of his interest. Id. The word "substantially" was
deleted in the final draft, apparently for fear that its inclusion would lead courts to deny
intervention in meritorious cases. Id. Similarly, representation is not to be confined to
"formal representation"; the court should also consider whether an existing party provides
"practical representation" of an applicant's interest. Advisory Committee's Note to
amended Rule 24, 28 U.S.C. app. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, at 433 (1976).

Timeliness and Intervention
between the right to intervene and the mode of intervention,2 6 and
suggested that the difficulty of integrating intervention of right with
ongoing proceedings might be overcome by limiting the character or
mode of intervention.2 7 Despite this suggestion, however, commentators
have feared that the impact on court efficiency might be significant. 28
Throughout the history of the intervention doctrine, the traditional
raison d'ftre of intervention of right-minimizing the injury to third
parties caused by judicial processes-has conflicted with court concern
about prejudice to existing parties and impairment of orderly judicial
processes. This central conflict has heightened steadily as the right to
intervene has been liberalized2 9 and the extent of public law litigation
has grown. 30 The conflict has become localized in the requirement
26. Moore & Levi, supra note 2, speak of the right to intervene and the rights of the
intervenor to distinguish between when intervention is allowable and what the intervenor
can do after he has intervened. Id. at 580. This distinction was apparently referred to in
the Advisory Committee's Note to amended Rule 24, 28 U.S.C. app. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, at
433 (1976): "An intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of
efficient conduct of the proceedings." Id. at 433. Although the Advisory Committee's use of
the phrase "an intervention of right" is ambiguous as between the right to intervene at all
and the mode or degree of intervention, apparently the latter was meant. See Kaplan,
supra note 20, at 403 n.178 (Advisory Committee's Note suggests that character of intervention itself may be shaped to circumstances); Shapiro, supra note 19, at 752 (Advisory
Committee's Note provokes question of what conditions on intervenor of right are appropriate).
27. For a discussion of possible limitations on the mode of intervention, see Shapiro,
supra note 19, at 752-56. For example, one entitled to become a party for a given purpose
or on a given issue does not necessarily become a party for every purpose or on every
issue. Id. at 754-55. Tailoring intervention to minimize the impact on orderly court procedure has long been a concern. See Eliot, supra note 6, at 389-90 (describing nineteenth
century procedures for disposing of actions while providing for subsequent adjudication
of rights of intervenors).
28. See Brunet, supra note 12, at 741-46; Shapiro, supra note 19, at 757-59.
29. See pp. 588-90 supra. This liberalization has complemented the general advantages
of intervening. One such advantage, for example, is that if the applicant has a right to
intervene, he does not need an independent ground of federal jurisdiction. 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRAcTiCE, supra note 3,
24.07[1], at 24-153; F. JAMEFS & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.19, at 515 (2d ed. 1977). By contrast, one seeking permissive intervention must
establish independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. Clanton v. Orleans Parish School
Bd., 72 F.R.D. 164, 169-70 (E.D. La. 1976). Moreover, the applicant for intervention as of
right does not need the standing required to initiate the suit. United States Postal Serv.
v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978).
An intervenor, whether of right or merely by permission, may also enjoy more control
over the proceedings than he would as an amicus curiae. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694, 704 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting reasons why amicus curiae status inadequate substitute for participation as party).
30. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1281-84 (1976) (new model of civil litigation emerging). The demand by third parties
for intervention in the expanding area of public law litigation has placed still further
pressure on the courts to develop the doctrine of intervention of right. In public law
litigation the party structure is "sprawling and amorphous" and "the effects of the litigation [are] not really confined to the persons at either end of the right-remedy axis." Id.
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of Rule 24(a)(2) that a party's application for intervention of right
must be timely.31
II.

The Obfuscations of Timeliness

Although trial courts apply many procedural rules at their discretion
without significant appellate review, 3 2 appellate courts have closely
scrutinized trial court rulings under the interest, impairment, and
representation conditions of Rule 24(a)(2). 33 The timeliness requirement, however, continues to confer on the trial court a great deal of
discretion. Because the timeliness rule is unnecessarily discretionary, it
creates the potential for injustice and threatens to erode the right to
intervene.
at 1284, 1289. Complex structural relief makes impact on nonparties more likely. See id.

at 1292-94; Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244, 256-

57 (1977). In addition, the litigation is often extremely protracted, "with a continuous and
intricate interplay between factual and legal elements," Chayes, supra at 1298, and court
involvement in such litigation extends far beyond the initial judgment, as the judge
adopts the role of policy planner and manager, id. at 1298-1302.
31. The timeliness requirement has always been a likely rubric under which to balance
the interests of applicants, parties, and court. See Note, The Requirement of Timeliness
Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 VA. L. REV. 863, 867 (1951)
(timeliness requirement an elemental form of laches or estoppel, designed to protect
original parties from prejudice due to intervenor's failure to apply sooner).
32. E.g., American Employers' Ins. Co. v. King Resources Co., 545 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th
Cir. 1976) (denial of motion to consolidate discretionary and will not be reversed absent
clear error or exigent circumstances); Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1973)
(denial of motion for severance not usually set aside without clear showing of abuse of
discretion).
The standard of review for an abuse of discretion is extremely weak. See Premium
Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial judge
abuses discretion only when decision based on erroneous conclusion of law or when
record contains no evidence on which decision rationally could have been based); Beshear
v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127, 134 (7th Cir. 1973) (discretion abused only when no reasonable person would accept view adopted by trial court; no abuse of discretion if reasonable persons could differ on propriety of trial court action).
33. For example, some circuit courts have established clear standards that trial courts
must follow in determining whether majority-race parents and teachers have the requisite
interest to intervene in school desegregation cases. See note 19 supra. Appellate courts
have also defined when practical impairment results. See note 21 supra. Similarly, trial
court discretion on representation rulings has been restrained by the Supreme Court's
holding that the burden of proving the inadequacy of representation is "minimal."
Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); see Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 130
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (applicants need only show that representation may be inadequate). Under
the scrutiny of the appellate courts, specific tests for when representation is inadequate
have begun to emerge. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Minn., Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1977) (representation inadequate when interests
merely disparate, not adverse); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(representation inadequate when interests do not coincide).
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A.

The Rule of NAACP v. New York
Prior to 1973, appellate courts had established the practice of deferring to trial court rulings on timeliness. 4 That year, however, the
Supreme Court explicitly mandated a deferential approach in NAACP
v. New York, 35 a case involving review of a district court order denying
the NAACP's motion to intervene either of right or permissively. The
Court held that timeliness is the first condition that must be satisfied
in order to intervene. 36 If on review the lower court's order denying
intervention is upheld on the basis of timeliness, there is no need for
the reviewing court even to consider whether the applicant has the
requisite interest, whether the interest is impaired, or whether the applicant is in any way represented. 3 7 Furthermore, the Court sanctioned
use of a very weak standard when reviewing trial court decisions on
timeliness: there is to be no reversal unless the trial court abused its
discretion. 38
In discussing determinations of timeliness, the Supreme Court established the general rule that the trial court is to take into account "all
the circumstances." 39 The Court probably believed that, in view of the
wide variety of factors courts have considered relevant to timeliness, 40
34. See, e.g., McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970); United

States v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 141, 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. 413 U.S. 345 (1973).
36. 413 U.S. at 365. This ranking of the timeliness determination has been accepted
by lower courts. See, e.g., Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir. 1975) (timeliness
"condition precedent" for right to intervene); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 72
F.R.D. 164, 168 (E.D. La. 1976) (timeliness "threshold requirement" for intervention).
37. 413 U.S. at 36.
38. Id. at 366; see note 32 supra (explaining abuse of discretion standard). Without
even the benefit of a lower court opinion, the Court surmised, as one factor in its decision
to affirm denial of intervention, that the trial court "could reasonably have concluded"
that NAACP knew or should have known of the pendency of the original action earlier
than NAACP allegedly was first informed of the action. 413 U.S. at 366-67.
39. 413 U.S. at 366.
40. Such factors include:
(1)the amount of time that has elapsed since the suit was initiated, or the stage to
which the suit has progressed, e.g., Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978) (stage of proceeding);
(2) the amount of time during which the applicant knew of the suit, e.g., NAACP v.
New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366-67 (1973);

(3) the amount of time during which the applicant knew that his interests were not

protected in the suit, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977);

(4) the reasons for any delay on the part of the applicant, e.g., NAACP v. New York,
413 U.S. 345, 367-68 (1973);
(5)whether the applicant claims a right to intervene or merely seeks permission to
intervene, e.g., EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975) (intervenor of right far more seriously impaired than permissive intervenor if application
denied as untimely);
(6) the interests of the applicant, Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918
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a flexible and pragmatic standard requires broad discretion below and
generous treatment on review. The Court provided examples of factors
relevant to a timeliness determination, including factors that are also
clearly relevant in deciding whether the interest, impairment, and
41
representation conditions are met.
The Primacy of Timeliness
By requiring a trial court presented with an application for intervention first to determine whether the application is timely, and by
mandating appellate court deference on review, the Supreme Court in
NAACP entrenched timeliness in a position of primacy.42 This approach, however, enables a trial court judge to ignore altogether the
issues of interest, impairment, and representation-arguably the essential aspects of the applicant's petition-provided the judge rules that
B.

(7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977);
(7) the extent of prejudice to the applicant should intervention be denied, Stallworth v.
Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1977);
(8) whether the applicant seeks to relitigate issues already decided, Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977);
(9) prejudice to existing parties that would result from the intervention, e.g., NAACP
v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 369 (1973);
(10) prejudice to existing parties resulting from the delay of the applicant in intervening, Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977);
(11) the disruption of the orderly processes of the court, e.g., United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Indus., Inc., 553 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978);
(12) unusual circumstances warranting intervention, e.g., NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S.
345, 368-69 (1973).
41. At issue in NAACP was whether, during the ten years preceding the filing of the
suit, voter qualifications prescribed by New York had been used by the counties of New
York, Bronx, and Kings for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging voting
rights on the basis of race. The Court considered relevant to timeliness: that the applicants did not allege personal injuries resulting from the discriminatory use of a
literacy test, a matter of the applicants' interest; that the applicants would not be foreclosed from challenging redistricting plans on the grounds of improper racial gerrymandering, a matter of practical impairment of interests; and that the applicants' claim
of inadequate representation by the United States was unsubstantiated, a matter of
adequacy of representation. See 413 U.S. at 368-69.
42. Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978), illustrates the present primacy
of timeliness and the adverse consequences of this primacy on the right to intervene.
Prisoners incarcerated at Pontiac prison brought an action for injunctive relief from the
control measures instituted by prison authorities following a prison riot. The prison
guards' union moved to intervene, apparently to express concern over security at the
prison as a consequence of the court's preliminary injunction. See id. at 306 (Pell, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). In affirming the lower court's denial of
intervention, the appellate court merely noted that the prison guards had been aware of
the litigation and that, although tlhe guards had known that the relief sought could impinge on their interests, their union did nothing until three weeks after the adverse
decision. Id. at 304 (majority opinion). The court's opinion failed to consider whether the
interests asserted by the union normally justify intervention or whether existing parties
adequately represented these interests. Furthermore, the court did not discuss whether
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the application to intervene is untimely. 43 Even if the trial court judge
takes these essential issues into account in some vague fashion, it is
likely that his reasoning on interest, impairment, and representation
will be less closely reviewed than if he had ruled on these conditions
directly. 44 The amount of discretion the trial court enjoys when the
application is not clearly timely thus approaches that enjoyed by the
court when the application is merely for permission to intervene. 45
The present standard for appellate review of trial court discretion on
timeliness is that authorized by NAA CP.4 When reviewing a ruling
on timeliness, appellate courts are restricted to reversing abuses of trial
court discretion and to prescribing factors that the lower court should
consider when making its determination on timeliness. 4 ' Appellate
courts generally do not rule on the balance of factors that presumptively should govern in particular classes of cases.
Despite the instruction of NAACP to consider all the circumstances, 48 the practice of the Supreme Court in that case, and of other
appellate courts in subsequent cases, 49 shows that trial courts are under
the intervention would disrupt orderly court proceedings or prejudice existing parties.
This reticence was particularly inappropriate because the court order was for preliminary
relief only; further proceedings in the action and reconsideration of the preliminary order
were clearly envisioned. Id. at 302-03.
43. See, e.g., Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming ruling of
untimeliness with sole remark that applicants had not shown any "extraordinary or
unusual circumstances" justifying "late intrusion" into suit); Clanton v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 72 F.R.D. 164, 168-70 (E.D. La. 1976) (ruling application untimely without considering stare decisis effect of suit on applicant's later challenges or adequacy of existing
representation).
44. For example, it is authoritatively settled that applicants bear only a minimal
burden of showing inadequacy of representation when establishing their right to intervene. See Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972). But under current practice,
a lower court's ruling on the adequacy of representation would be accorded more deference
on review if the court considers representation not as a separate issue, but merely as a
factor in its ruling on timeliness. See, e.g., United States v. Marion County School Dist.,
590 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (ruling that district court, in exercising its discretion on
timeliness, must weigh against applicant the protection afforded through representation
by existing parties).
45. Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is "discretionary by definition." Hodgson
v. UMV, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. See, e.g., Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing NAACP
for principle that trial court ruling on timeliness will not be disturbed on review unless
discretion abused); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 553 F.2d 451, 453 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (same).
47. See, e.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263-66 (5th Cir. 1977) (court
considered itself confined to mandating that trial courts consider certain factors and
ignore others). Even when an abuse of discretion is found in a particular case, an indefinitely broad range of factors is still considered relevant to timeliness. See, e.g., United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1977); id. at 402-03 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. 413 U.S. at 366.
49. See notes 42 & 43 supra (citing examples); note 40 supra (surveying wide range of
factors encompassed by "all the circumstances").
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little obligation to justify their timeliness rulings.5 0 Otherwise deserving applicants may be denied participation for many reasons, ranging
from a judge's mere inadvertence to the merits of an applicant's petition to the judge's inclination to keep the litigation narrow. If the
ruling is couched as a denial on the basis that the application to intervene was not timely, there is little likelihood that an appellate court
will reverse.
This approach to intervention allows the trial court, as well as the
appellate court, to avoid addressing the difficult but central issue posed
by intervention of right: when should unrepresented and adversely
affected nonparties be allowed to participate in litigation, despite some
detriment to existing parties and some disruption of orderly court
calendars? If any presumptions or rules of law are appropriate for
striking a systematic and principled balance among an applicant, the
parties, and the court, they are unlikely to arise from a practice that
treats every case as peculiarly different. 51 The exacting appellate scrutiny that could evaluate trial court practices and render them consistent
is lacking under the case-by-case balancing paradigm fostered by
NAACP, and thus there is no mechanism to channel judicial experience
into the development of principles that would give meaning to "timeliness."
Far from evolving principles to govern the timeliness of a motion to
intervene as of right, current practice is more likely to undermine the
right itself. If a trial court is permitted to dispose of many applications
solely on its discretionary and lightly reviewed timeliness ruling, while
weighing the interest,5 2 impairment,5 3 and representation 4 issues in
only some vague way if at all, then little remains to distinguish inter50. Cf. note 15 suPra (neither Rule nor Advisory Committee Notes offer guidelines on
timeliness); F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 29, § 10.19, at 516 (detail avoided in rule
in order to provide more room for judicial discretion).
51. See Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914
(1977) ("Although precedents under Rule 24(a)(2) are helpful, each case must rise and
fall on its own peculiar facts and circumstances."); Black v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,
500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974) (because Rule 24 silent on what constitutes timeliness,
question must be answered in each case by discretion of court).
52. See, e.g., Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (considering interest of intervenors as factor relevant to timeliness); Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118,
129 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (considering interest of applicants in scope of relief relevant to timeliness).
53. See, e.g., Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (considering as
relevant to timeliness fact that applicants' rights could be irretrievably lost if intervention
were not permitted).
54. See, e.g., NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 368 (1973) (considering fact that applicants' claim of inadequate representation was unsubstantiated as relevant to timeliness).
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vention of right from permissive intervention.55 Incorporation of the
essential conditions of a right to intervene into the "all the circumstances" rubric of timeliness may signal an eventual collapse of the
right to intervene into the more discretionary permissive intervention.
III. The Internal Ordering of Rule 24(a)(2)
Restructuring Rule 24(a)(2) may prevent this collapse of the right
to intervene while preserving a degree of trial court discretion on
timeliness. Such a restructuring would ensure that the proper balance
between the interests of the applicants, the parties, and the court is
considered, and provide a mechanism for evolving more specific rules
of law defining timeliness.
A.

Serially OrderingRule 24(a)(2)

This Note proposes that Rule 24(a)(2) be restructured or reinterpreted so that the necessary conditions of a right to intervene are
serially ordered as follows:
Anyone shall be permitted to intervene as of right in an action when
(i) the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties; and
(ii) the application is timely.
Three relationships define what is meant here by a "serial order."
First, the order indicates the sequence in which the trial court should
address the conditions. A ruling must be made on whether the applicant
meets condition (i) before the court moves to consider condition (ii).
Second, the proposal organizes the conditions in order of their importance. Condition (i) ensures operation of the central policy distinguishing the concept of a right to intervene from permissive intervention: judicial concern for fairness to nonparties. 51 Placing condition
55. The distinction has been narrowed to such an extent that commentators can say
that the criteria for intervention of right "are different in degree rather than kind from
those governing intervention upon permission of the court." F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, suPra
note 29, § 10.19, at 514. However accurate this may be as a description of current intervention practice, it marks a development that was not intended. See pp. 587-88 supra.
56. See pp. 587-88 suPra.
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(i) before condition (ii) requires the trial court to consider this essential concern before passing to the question of timeliness.
Third, the order reflects a diminishing burden of proof on the party
claiming a right to intervene. Once an applicant demonstrates that the
interest, impairment, and representation criteria of condition (i) are
met,57 he should not bear as heavy a burden of proof on timeliness as
he might were his status under condition (i) unknown or his application one for permissive intervention only.58
B.

Consequences of Serially OrderingRule 24(aX2)

By serially ordering Rule 24(a)(2), several advantages would be
gained. The foremost is that such a Rule would encourage the judiciary
to develop principled answers to the central issue now posed by intervention of right.5 9 Trial courts, as well as reviewing courts, would have
to decide under what circumstances an applicant should be allowed to
participate once he has demonstrated that he has the requisite interest,
that his ability to protect that interest may be practically impaired, and
that he is inadequately represented. This problem is precisely the issue
posed by timeliness, for such an application should be granted unless
it is untimely. The serially ordered structure, while neutral as to the
particular content that courts might develop, 60 would facilitate judicial
57. Although this Note does not argue that an internal serial ordering of condition
(i) is necessary, there may be reasons for considering interest only after impairment and
representation. Nonparties who may be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation and who are capable of introducing new evidence and argument that may affect that
outcome should be heard within the context of the litigation before the harm is done.
Under current doctrine, the interest asserted by the applicant must be a "significantly
protectable interest." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); see United
States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978) (intervention
requires direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings). It may be
doubted, however, whether such a substantial interest barrier is needed to control the
flood of would-be intervenors; in fact, the first two conditions alone may be adequate.
See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969). At any rate, the interest
requirement should be viewed as of lesser importance than either impairment or representation, and perhaps it should have more influence on the manner of participation that
is allowed to the applicant than on the decision about whether the applicant should be
heard at all. See id. at 179-80.
58. The burden of showing the inadequacy of existing representation has already
been minimized. See note 44 supra.
Some courts have held that the timeliness decision should be treated more leniently in
intervention of right petitions than in those seeking permissive intervention. E.g., Alaniz
v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978). But
this approach may miss an important distinction. The applicant should not lessen his
burden of proving timeliness merely by claiming a right to intervene; he should show
that he otherwise has a right to intervene by demonstrating that he satisfies condition (i).
59. See pp. 591-92, 596 supra.
60. For example, the serial structure is neutral as to whether to define timeliness differently in connection with government enforcement suits than in connection with private
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evolution of more specific principles defining timeliness. 0 1
Moreover, there would not be an immediate need to attempt to
replace the current vague timeliness requirement with a more specific
rule of law.6 2 By placing the decision on timeliness after those on
interest, impairment, and representation, the range of factors that
would be taken into account in ruling on the application would not
be curtailed. By tying the applicant's burden of proof on timeliness to
the trial court's findings on the other conditions, however, the presently unbridled trial court discretion over how to balance all the
factors affecting timeliness0 3 would be somewhat restricted because
suits. Although court reasoning on the interest, impairment, and representation requirements may appropriately be influenced by the fact that the main action is a government
enforcement action, see Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1174 (1976), such a fact has less obvious relevance to timeliness. The courts may
nevertheless decide that prejudice to prosecutorial discretion is a central element of timeliness when private party applicants seek to attack a final decree based on government
consent. Cf. id. at 1197 (intervention to challenge consent decree increases potential for
interfering with governmental discretion over amount of resources to expend, chances of
victory, and disclosures at trial). Whatever position the courts take, however, on whether
to treat enforcement actions differently from private actions when defining timeliness, the
increased appellate control generated by the proposed serial ordering should serve to
implement the decision.
61. There is reason to think that, under appellate scrutiny, presumptions governing
the appropriate balance of interests under timeliness would be forthcoming. For example,
the holding in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), suggests that whenever a motion to intervene to appeal a denial of class action status is promptly made
within the proper appeals period, the motion is presumptively timely. Id. at 392-96.
It might also be possible to establish through appellate review rebuttable presumptions
governing post-judgment applications for intervention. Although a rule has developed in
some courts that post-judgment applications should be granted only in unusual circumstances, see, e.g., McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970),
when applicants seek only to participate in the remedial phase of an action, timeliness
should not be an automatic barrier to post-judgment intervention, see Hodgson v.
UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972), especially since intervention may be desirable
in light of wide trial court discretion to devise equitable remedies. Likewise, the decision
of a party who receives an adverse judgment not to appeal may itself be relevant to the
issues of adequacy of representation and timeliness. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 181
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
Another issue on which appellate courts should establish rules of law is "protective
interiention." One approach is to insist upon early "protective" intervention in a suit
whenever the applicant's interests might be at risk. E.g., Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572
F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978) (denying intervention to applicants who should have joined negotiations before settlement if knew of risk of detrimental decree). Another approach is to approve waiting for adverse developments in
the litigation before moving to intervene. E.g., Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 770
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977) (allowing intervention to applicants who
did not seek to intervene until plaintiffs abandoned initial claims). Potential applicants
should be given more specific guidelines, however, and not merely be told that delay in
applying for intervention is a factor to be considered by the trial judge in his discretion.
E.g., Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976)
(reason for delay a factor that ought to inform district court's discretion).
62. See pp. 593-96 supra (discussing vagueness of timeliness requirement and seeming
need for trial court discretion).
63. See note 40 supra (listing relevant factors).
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consideration of interest, impairment, and representation would be
ensured and their separate weight in the timeliness balancing could be
scrutinized. This arrangement would reduce appellate court deference
to a trial court's weighting of the elements of condition (i) in ruling
on timeliness. The increased accountability of the trial judge should
generate an increased disposition in the lower court to explain why,
despite the fact that a particular applicant has met condition (i), he has
been barred from participation. 4 Exposing such reasoning would
facilitate appellate court judgments on fairness and efficiency. This
interactive structure, it is hoped, would rekindle pressure on the
federal court system to evolve a theory on the requirements of justice
toward adversely affected nonparties and to widen the narrowing distance between intervention of right and permissive intervention.
Finally, courts have held that the applicant's interest, impairment,
and representation are relevant factors under timeliness. 61 But reducing
these considerations to mere factors under the vague timeliness requirement encourages courts to ignore them altogether. The court's determinations on the interest, impairment, and representation requirements should be made before the court rules on timeliness, and the
applicant's burden of showing timeliness should be reduced once those
requirements are met. When the requirements under condition (i) are
satisfied, they should be given weight automatically as the applicant
undertakes to establish timeliness.
Conclusion
The history of the intervention doctrine displays a persistent judicial
attempt to evolve a general solution to the question of when applicants possess a right to intervene. At some point, justice to nonparties who possess interests that are adversely affected yet unrepresented would seem to outweigh both the detriment to existing parties
and the possible imposition on court processes. Identifying this point
by a rule of law is difficult. The simple device of serially ordering the
conditions for a right to intervene, however, and of placing the timeliness decision at the end of that list promises to move the courts
toward a more adequate theory of intervention of right without unduly
impairing the trial court's ability to manage increasingly complex
litigation.
64. It is surely too inefficient simply to require hearings, formal findings, and opinions
on all motions to intervene as of right. The preferable situation is to have fewer marginal
applications summarily dismissed or dismissed with very little reasoning.
65. See pp. 594-97 supra.
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